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fourteenth. Therefore those who would urge integration of the remaining lawfully segregated establishments would be well advised
to do so by boycott, lawful picketing, or other means not involving
the invasion of the segregated property. Otherwise, they run the
risk of sustained convictions under clear, narrowly-drawn statutes.
DAvID

B. SENTELLE

Constitutional Law-State Cannot Award Damages for Invasion
of Privacy Without Proof of Actual Malice
The United States Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,' held that a state court could not constitutionally award
damages i~a a libel suit by a public official against a critic of his
official conduct without a showing of actual malice-that defendant
knew the statement was false or that there was a reckless disregard
for its truth. The malice requirement has since been extended to
a prosecution under a state criminal libel statute.2 In the recent
case of Time, Inc. v. Hill,3 the Court extended the malice requirement to a civil action for damages brought under a state invasion of
privacy statute.4
In September of 1952 plaintiff Hill and his family were held
hostage for nineteen hours in their home outside Philadelphia. The
captors-three escaped convicts-then released the family unharmed.
The following spring, a novel5 was published describing "the experience of a family of four held hostage by three escaped convicts
in the family's suburban home."' The family in the novel suffered
violence and verbal abuse at the hands of the convicts, while the
Hill family had not. When a play made from the book opened for
1376 U.S. 254 (1964).

"Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). New York Times and
Garrison involved respectively a city commissioner and state criminal court
judges-all clearly "public officials." In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75
(1966) the public official concept was extended to include a commissioner
of a county ski recreation area.
"385 U.S. 374 (1967).
'N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51. Section 50 makes the use "for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture
of any living person" without that person's consent, a misdemeanor. Section
51 gives any person whose name is so used, remedies in the form of actions
for an injunction and for damages.
HArTs, TuE DESPERATE HouRs (1953).
"385 U.S. at 378.
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tryouts in Philadelphia, Life Magazine published a story captioned
"True Crime Inspires Tense Play."7 The text stated that the book
and play had been "inspired by the [Hill] family's experience." '
Plaintiff Hill brought an action for damages under the New York
statute and, after two trials, an award of $30,000 compensatory
damages0 was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals."0 That
court construed the statute as allowing a cause of action only for
the fictionalized, or false, use of one's name for trade purposes."
While refusing to condemn the statute as unconstitutional on
its face, the Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan, held that
the first amendment protections of free speech and press prohibited
application of the statute without proof of actual malice. Since under
the trial court's instructions the jury could have found liability
without finding that the false statements were made knowingly or
recklessly, the case was remanded for a possible new trial.
Inception of the right of privacy is cited as the classic illustration of the forceful impact of scholarly comment upon the law.'"
Despite its relatively recent development,13 the right is now said to
have been recognized in thirty-four states and the District of Columbia. 14 It is distinguishable from defamation principally because
Feb. 28, 1955, p. 75.
'Life,
8
Id.at 75.

'At the initial jury trial plaintiff was awarded $50,000 compensatory

and $25,000 punitive damages. A new trial was ordered as to damages only
and, after waiver of a jury, plaintiff was awarded $30,000 compensatory
damages by the court.
" Hill v. Hayes, 15 N.Y.2d 986, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7, 207 N.E.2d 604 (1965).
" The statute contains no such limitation on its face. N.Y. CivIL RIGHTS
LAw §§ 50-51. However, in an opinion handed down between the argument
of Hill in the Supreme Court and the date of decision, the New York Court
of Appeals made it clear that "factual reporting of newsworthy persons and
events is in the public interest and is protected." Spalm v. Julian Messner,
Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 328, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877, 879, 221 N.E.2d 543, 545 (1966).
" Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. R-v. 383 (1960).
" Its beginnings are generally traced to a law review article published
in 1890. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAv. L. Rlv. 193
(1890). See generally, Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CoNneM1. PRoB. 326 (1966); Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALIF. L. lRv. 383 (1960); Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy,
15 VAND. L. Rav. 1093 (1962).
1,Of the thirty-five jurisdictions recognizing the right, thirty-one have
done so by case law, while four have statutory provisions. PROSSER, ToRTS
831-32 (3d ed. 1964).
Recently, Professor Kalven has questioned the substance of the right.
He notes that "the lack of legal profile and the enormity of the counter-privilege [to serve the public interest in news] converge to raise for me the
question of whether privacy is really a viable tort remedy. The mountain,
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damage results from the infliction of mental distress, while in
defamation, harm to reputation is the critical element. 15 Dean
Prosser has subdivided the privacy tort into four categories: intrusion, disclosure, false light and appropriation. 6 Hill involved
the third category, described as placing the plaintiff "in a false light
in the public eye.'

17

1

Generally, though the press is privileged to report, matters of
"public interest," fictionalization of such matters has been held to
nullify the privilege.' The Supreme Court in Hill establishes the
proposition that although there is fictionalization, the "public interest" privilege is not defeated unless there was knowledge of the
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. The privilege formerly
existing is not only, expanded, but is raised to a constitutional level.
Mr. Justice Brennan, in the opinion of the Court, reasons that
because of the vast range of matter published in the press the risk
of public exposure has become inherent in our society, one "which
places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press."' He
argues that freedom of discussion must encompass all issues, and
cannot be limited to areas of political expression., He points out
that erroneous statements are no less likely in the area involved in
Hill than in the context of official conduct, and that since the New
York Times rule was fashioned because of the likelihood of error
in that context, it should be applied here too. Mr. Justice Brennan
insists that the result was not reached through a rote application of
the New York Times principles, but only upon consideration of the
factors that arise in the Hill factual setting.20
I suggest, has brought forth a pretty small mouse." Kalven, Privacy in Tort
Law-were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.

326, 337 (1966). However, for a provocative argument that the privacy
action is destined to eventually swallow up defamation actions, see Wade,
Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1093 (1962).
A North Carolina case recognized the right whereplaintiff's photograph
was used in an advertisement under a false name and without her consent.
But in the absence of proof of special damages only nominal damages were
allowed. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
N 9 subsequent North Carolina cases have been found on the point.
Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 57,
27 N.E.2d 753, 755 (1940).
1" Intrusion consists of invading the plaintiff's physical solitude, disclosure is publicity of private information about the plaintiff and appropriation is the use of plaintiff's name or likeness for the defendant's benefit.
TORTS 833-44 (3d ed. 1964).
PROSSaR,
17
Id.at 837.
18 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
19385 U.S. at 388.
"We find applicable here the standard of knowing or reckless false-
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Whatever factors may have been present in Hill, the political
setting upon which the Court relied in New York Times was absent.
New York Times and two later cases in which the rationale was
expanded 2 ' involved libel actions by governmental officials against
critics of their official conduct. In each case the Court relied upon
the factual backdrop of the political arena in applying a constitutional
buffer protecting unintended falsity. 2 The principal case, in contrast, was a privacy action by a private individual. His conduct was
in no way "official" nor was it in any sense political.
Plaintiffs in New York Times, Garrisonand Rosenblatt had an
opportunity to rebut the falsity that was not available to Hill because they were all public officials when the falsity was published
and had considerable access to news media. Hill's cause of action
arose when Life published its fictionalized report of the incidenttwo years after he had been involuntarily placed in the limelight.
At that time, whatever accessibility to the press he might have had
by virtue of the event was gone.
Mr. Justice Black, in an opinion in which Mr. Justice Douglas
joined, concurred in the remand of the case but disagreed with the
Court's constitutional principles.2" His rationale is by far the
hood not through blind application of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, relating solely to libel actions by public officials, but only upon
consideration of the factors which arise in the particular context of
the application of the New York statute in cases involving private
individuals. This is neither a libel action by a private individual nor
a statutory action by a public official. Therefore, although the First
Amendment principles pronounced in New York Times guide our
conclusion, we reach that conclusion only by applying these principles in this discrete context.
Id. at 390-91.
" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), involved a
libel suit by an elected city commissioner against the publisher of an advertisement imputing false misconduct to law enforcement officials who
worked under plaintiff's supervision. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964), dealt with a criminal libel prosecution against a state district attorney who had criticized the official conduct of certain judges. Rosenblatt
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), involved a libel suit by a supervisor of a
county recreation area against the publisher of a newspaper column imputing misconduct to a small group of which plaintiff was a member.
"oIn all three the Court stated that it had considered the cases against
a background of "profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 383 U.S. at 85, 379 U.S. at 75,
376 U.S. at 270.
211385 U.S. at 398-401. (Opinion of Black, J., concurring.)
' See e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 94 (1966) (Opinion of
Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); New York Times Co.
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simplest of those presented in the decision. He begins with the
premise, set out in his concurring opinion in New York Times,
that at the minimum there must be an "unconditional right to say
what one pleases about public affairs."2' '5 He feels the majority is
wrong in balancing the competing values of free speech and the
right to privacy because this gives to judges the power to choose
between conflicting values when, in his view, that choice has already
been made by the framers when they adopted the first amendment.
Further, he feels that this portends future "balancing" by which
other freedoms embodied in the Bill of Rights will be eroded away.
Mr. Justice Black's view appears subject to much of the same
criticism as the Court's. However absolute the freedoms of press
and speech may be, the political settings in New York Times and
subsequent cases seem to have presented a much greater need for
free speech than did Hill. The need for unhampered discussion of
public officials' conduct is surely more vital than the need for news
coverage of the opening of a play. Yet if one accepts Mr. Justice
Black's principle that the first amendment freedoms are absolute,
the above criticism is foreclosed. There can be no weighing of the
competing values of free speech and the potential harm from speech
because the framers of the constitution made that choice-in favor
of free speech.
Mr. Justice Douglas, while concurring in Mr. Justice Black's
opinion, adds two salient points in a separate opinion."' First, since
the book and play revived the public interest created by the incident
in Hill, news stories dealing with them were privileged. Fictionalization of those events-deemed to have given rise to the cause of
action-is no more beyond the public interest privilege, in his view,
than "a water color of the assassination of a public official" 2 7 would
be. He feels that any right of privacy in this context is irrelevant.
Second, the exception created by the majority for knowing or reckless falsity gives, he thinks, too broad a discretion to the jury and
will prove to be no bar to a recovery when emotions are high and
prejudices present.
Should the privilege to report events of public interest vanish
when the reports are fictionalized? Mr. Justice Douglas seems to
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Opinion of Black, J., concurring).
2'1376 U.S. at 297.
20211d.
385 atU.S.
401.at 401-02. (Opinion of Douglas, J., concurring.)
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argue that it should not in any event, in order that the creative
process may have full protection of the first amendment. Still, it is
also arguable that the privilege should be defeated when the fictionalization causes greater harm than a factual account would have
caused. 28 The Hills, however, were depicted as undergoing more
suffering and as displaying more courage than they did in fact.
This may have created more public sympathy and admiration than
otherwise would have been the case, but there is little likelihoodat least in the ordinary sense--that additional harm resulted. Thus,
in the factual circumstances of Hill, whichever argument is accepted,
the result for which Mr. Justice Douglas contends seems sound.
His second contention-that the malice requirement will be a
small obstacle to emotional juries-appears equally sound. If a
jury's whims are too uncertain to risk the use of a negligence standard, as Mr. Justice Brennan contended for the Court, a malice
standard is likely to be just as uncertain. A jury emotionally drawn
to one side of a case will in all probability decide in favor of that
side whether the finding required is one of negligence or of malice.
Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the remand of the case but
dissented from the Court's application of the New York Times
standard. 9 He feels that the Court's protection of unintentional
falsehood in that case was based on two principles: the inevitability
of error in dealing with abstract matters and the undesirability of
the censorship that might arise if the elusive concept of "truth" were
placed in the hands of juries. However, he argues, these principles
do not negative a state's interest in encouraging thorough preparation and checking of material before publication. Further, he contends, because the New York Times political setting and the likelihood of competition of ideas on the matter at issue were absent in
Hill, the state interest is much stronger here. Thus, he feels that a
" Thus, cases in which falsification has been held to have exceeded the
public interest privilege have generally involved falsehood that, while not
defamatory, was at least in some way derogatory. See e.g., Leverton v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951) (Plaintiff was photographed lying injured after a pedestrian accident. The photo was used-

twenty months later-in an article to illustrate "pedestrian carelessness"
when in fact plaintiff had not been careless); Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952) (A photo of plaintiffs (husband and
wife) with arms around each other was used with a story about love. The
photo depicted "love at first sight," described in the article as bad and lead-

ing to divorce, when in fact plaintiffs were happily married.)
2 385 U.S. at 402-411. (Opinion of Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part.)
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more limited protective "breathing space" is required in the Hill
situation, and that a state should be able to "hold the press to a
duty of making a reasonable investigation of the underlying
facts ....,,30
In New York Times, application of the principles described
above by Mr. Justice Harlan was plainly grounded on the peculiarly
vital function that free discussion serves in the area of politics and
government; and just as plainly, that political background was
absent in Hill. Hence, there is much logic in Mr. Justice Harlan's
argument that the facts in Hill call for a more limited immunization
of falsity. His proposal that the negligence standard be adopted is
also supported by his analogy to other professions upon which such
a standard is imposed."' That standard is no more objectionable
on the ground of uncertainty due to jury prejudice than is the
present standard of malice."
Speaking for the dissenters,3 3 Mr. Justice Fortas seems to agree
with the constitutional principles laid down by Mr. Justice Brennan
-that a state may validly subject a party to liability for knowingly
34
or recklessly publishing false matter about a private individual.
He feels, however, that the remand was possibly a guise used by
the majority to camouflage a more permissive constitutional rule,
and with that he disagrees.8 5 Further, Mr. Justice Fortas argued
that under the jury instructions (covering both punitive and compensatory damages) given by the trial court, knowing or reckless
publication was found. In his view, the verdict could not have been
rendered under the instruction on punitive damages without having
been predicated on a finding of the requisite knowledge or reck"Id. at 409.
"lBoth the medical and the legal professions were cited as examples.
Id. at 410 & n.7.
" A publication must have been made with "knowledge of its falsity or
in reckless disregard of the truth" before a state may constitutionally condemn it by damage awards. Id. at 387-88.
" Id. at 411-20. (Opinion of Fortas, J., dissenting, in which Mr. Justice
Clark and the Chief Justice join.)
" Mr. Justice Fortas also agrees with the Court's refusal to hold the
New York statute unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 411.
" Perhaps the purpose of the decision here is to indicate that this
Court will place insuperable obstacles in the way of recovery by
persons who are injured by reckless and heedless assaults provided
they are in print, and even though they are totally divorced from fact.
If so, I should think that the Court would cast its decision in constitutional terms.

Id. at Ibid.
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lessness. s6 Though the instructions were not letter perfect, he urged
that they met the standard set out by the majority.
The members of the Court seem to fit into three basic groups on
the constitutional issue in the principal case. Justices Black and
Douglas adhere to the absolute view that a state should not be permitted, constitutionally, to award damages for the publication of
any matter in the public interest, even including calculated falsity.
Mr. Justice Harlan, at the other end of the spectrum, feels that a
state should be able, constitutionally, to award damages to a private
citizen for publication of false matter in the public interest if the
publisher failed to use reasonable care in verifying its truth. The
six other members of the Court, including the dissenters, contend
that a state may constitutionally impose civil sanctions for knowing
or reckless publication of false matter in the public interest where
private individuals are involved. The majority view thus lies in a
middle ground between the two extremes.
The majority has clearly made a policy determination that the
right of free speech outweighs a private individual's "right of
privacy" where there is no intentional falsity; but they reach Mr.
Justice Black's result with Mr. Justice Harlan's rationale. Accordingly, the court's rationale might be more appropriately articulated in terms of the absolute right that free speech is coming
to be. In any event, by extending the public interest privilege to a
constitutional level, Hill seems likely to limit considerably the future
usefulness of "privacy" as a tort.
PHILIP L. KELLOGG

The jury at the first trial was instructed that it might award exemplary damages only if they found that defendant
falsely connected plaintiffs with The Desperate Hours and that this
was done knowingly or through failure to make a reasonable investigation ....
[Y] ou do not need to find that there was any actual ill
will or personal malice toward the plaintiffs if you find a reckless
or wanton disregard of the plaintiffs' rights.
Id. at 416. Although the majority seized upon the portion of the instruction
that allowed the jury to make an award upon a finding of "failure to make a
reasonable investigation," Mr. Justice Fortas felt that, taken as a whole,
it met the New York Tives standard.

